Because it is of utmost importance to unleash the eyes of those who did not resist embellishing to cast doubt in their minds by the Carter Center on the credibility of the presidential election of 2011 in the DRC, we return to the subject to show the nonsense of the opinion that sought to be admitted certainly for ulterior objectives.
The election issue in the DRC raises doubts about the relevance of the observations of each other. Indeed at first it was the official website of the electoral commission (CENI) that was hijacked by an unknown hand in order to show false results of the presidential election of November 28, 2011. Then fell a statement called "Post - Election Statement of the compilation and announcement of provisional results of the presidential election" published on the Carter Center website, which is of a so doubtful professionalism that one would think if it actually comes from a prestigious center named after the former U.S. President.
Is it this statement that is not credible, or rather the Congolese election the center says not to be? If, against common sense, it would enjoy, however, the moral authority which it is named after, we will then conclude that, when it comes to the DRC, the Carter Mission is not required to meet international standards with regard to the restitution of the findings of an election observation.
The analysis of this statement attributed to the Carter Center raises legitimate suspicions naturally credibility, given the fact that it does not meet either on the form or in substance with international standards in this area. The following is an independent assessment of the Declaration by reference to the standards set by three authoritative international institutions:
1.The Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation (DPO), subscribed to by, on October 24, 2005, 37 observer groups including: The Carter Center itself, the European Commission, the Organization of the United Nations, Organization of American States ...
2.The election observation guidelines (DOE) of the European Union (EU), second edition 2008;
3.The Practical guide for monitoring groups of national elections in the Southern African Development Community, SADC (SADC-ESN).
The reports of election observation in accordance with the above references are:
1. Interim reports: issued throughout the observation process, these reports are used for internal communication within the group of observation;
2. The opening statement: According to EU Directives, this statement is "the first post-election evaluation performed, released at a press conference 48 hours after the polls close. It is intended for the public and should be designed to be read by election stakeholders in the host country (candidates, political parties, domestic observers, journalists, voters, etc.). It presents the findings and preliminary conclusions of the observation mission on the steps of the electoral process which has just taken place and shall specify how the mission considers that the elections were conducted, until the declaration in accordance with international electoral standards. As such, the opening statement is an important indicator of the credibility of the electoral process for election stakeholders "(emphasis added)
3. A second opening statement: it is optional and can be made out if the mission considers that it must continue to observe the end of the counting process, the tabulation and the publication of results.
4. The final report: it contains the overall assessment of the election by the mission. It is released within two months after the end of the electoral process.
Examination of the facts as to the form of findings of the Carter Mission
As of November 30, 2011, two days after the election, the Carter Center publishes on its website the first draft of its mission statement on the elections of 28 November 2011 under the title "Democratic Republic of Congo, Presidential and Legislative Elections, Nov. 28, 2011 Post Election Preliminary Statement." This statement is published in English and we are not aware of any publication in French.
In this regard, the required international standard is: "The declaration must be evenly distributed ... for information in appropriate languages, to representatives of their areas of responsibility." The main recipient of the statement in question is none other than the Congolese people who speak French and not English. Who then is it for?
In a press briefing the same day, November 30, 2011, at the Grand Hotel Kinshasa, the mission makes public the Declaration. On this occasion, it keeps the rule of delivering their opinion on the overall credibility of the electoral process and the voting process itself. This statement only highlights the enthusiasm of the Congolese people on election day and the organizational shortcomings.
The prudence observed by the Carter Mission at that time was already in fact a departure from international standards which require the observer to make public his views on the proper conduct of elections immediately after the election regardless of the publication of the results thereof. This is to ensure that the observer does not change its preliminary findings on the electoral process accordingly after the results are published.
A careful reading of the declaration of November 30 shows that at this stage already all acts of violence that characterized the pre-election period and election day are placed on the back of the Government of the DRC. This is reminiscent of the attitude of a report by Human Rights Watch published a few days ago and spoke of 18 cases of murder by the presidential guard without providing evidence to date despite the insistent demands of prosecutors. The latest news is Human Rights Watch would have said to have drawn information from a website!
Another important fact to note is that on the same day of 30 November 2011, the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS ), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) have issued a joint preliminary statement commending the efforts made by CENI for the satisfactory conduct of these elections while deploring the violence that marred the election.
The African missions conformed well to point 8 of OPD which requirement can be read as follows: "The organizations that endorse this Declaration and the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers attached to the Declaration commit to cooperate with each other in part of the international election observation missions. Observation can be performed, for example, individual missions, for observation missions or joint ad hoc collaborative missions. In all cases, organizations that adopt the Declaration agree to cooperate to get the most out of the action of their observer missions." This obligation is supported by the DOE of the EU state: "A common practice groups of observers who are signatories to the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation is to share their findings prior to the publication of their preliminary statements."
Neither the mission of the Carter Center nor the EU has followed this standard by joining the African delegations that day. Already at this stage, it is questionable whether this similarity in behavior of the Western delegations who gave the impression to obey a single watchword!
In addition, international standards require observation missions to respect the authority of the host country and the authority organizing the elections in these terms: "The international election observation missions should be conducted in accordance with the sovereignty of the country holding the elections ... They must respect the laws and authorities, including electoral institutions of the country that hosts them.” This respect is expressed in particular by "notice of the preliminary statement to the local authority holding the elections at least one hour before the press conference ..." according to DOE. However, the Office of the CENI learned of the preliminary statements of Western observers at the same time as the public!
Apart from these acts of insubordination standards for communication of their findings and contempt against the Congolese authorities, the doubtful professionalism of the Declaration of the Carter Center can also be found in the fact that according to the DOE, the Chief Observer of the mission signs the observation report. In this case the statement is signed by the Carter Center person. The published statement merely indicates two names and two telephone numbers which are neither those of the former President of Zambia, Rupiah Banda Bwezani or those of vice-president of the Carter Center, Dr. John Stremlau who led the Mission in the DRC. We just learned also that Rupiah Banda has made a statement in which he said he did not recognize the statement attributed to the mission he led.
To close this chapter on considerations about the shape, it should be noted, too, the translation of the Declaration in the French language is often very rough, forcing the interested reader to refer to the English to understand what the mission means exactly. The reader can notice it from reading the quotes from the Declaration faithfully reproduced in the text. How can we relate the name of a respected president to a mission met with such shortcomings?
b) "Other exorbitant restrictions were applied to the media. The High Council for Audiovisual and Communication has suspended two broadcast networks without a formal decision and a newspaper close to the opposition. In Mbuji Mayi, police closed the RLTV for no reason. "
The international standard violated by these inappropriate positions has already been exposed in the first part of the article.
Conclusion
This election leads to many unanswered questions right now, including:
a) Is Congolese people entitled to a President of their choice or election of the latter should take place elsewhere?
b) Why did the international community recommend in word and deed the holding of the election when they knew fully well that the delay beyond the date of December 6 disqualified the current constitution and plunging the country's institutions in the crisis of illegitimacy that has lasted 46 years and from which the country was released in 2006 with the help of the same international community?
c) What is this invisible hand that wants to sabotage the election on November 28 and prevent the people from voting across the country?
d) Why one expatriate community (Chinese) had been particularly targeted by pre-and post-election violence?
e) Is the return of peace in this country really the central concern of the international community?
f) Is it true or not that before the election some Congolese had access to the ballot?
g) How many Congolese were unable to exercise their right to vote and why?
h) How the votes cast by the Congolese were not considered and why?
Whether the Carter Center says it or not, history will record that in this country, men and exceptional women have held truly democratic elections in a unique political context (characterized by a breed of politicians who lie to one religion), in particular binding deadlines for the sole purpose to save the Congo the risk of falling into the vagaries of the illegitimacy of its institutions to the fateful date of December 6, 2011.
It is for this reason that the Congolese opposition in its majority and its outside sponsors have desired that the elections be postponed (according to the Chairman of CENI, it was also the opinion of the Carter Mission). In this way, without consulting the decision maker (people), everyone could still take part in the division, it was enough to say loud and clear as in the heyday, "no one has been elected"! Today we know that between the walkabouts and polls there is a big difference.
It is careful to lay flowers to the men and women of the CENI, which some have demonstrated courage similar to that of the heroes of Chernobyl, for it is written that we must never give the Congolese a chance to be proud neither of their leaders nor their actions!
The conclusion of Carter's mission is: "This statement (read: any irregularities are found) does not affect the order of the results of candidates such that` announced by the CENI but specifies that the compilation process is not ... credible. " It comes to that because in all conscience they know that all the memoranda they filmed on the front of polling stations, those they have purchased or received from political parties and NGOs are in perfect harmony with the results posted on the Internet by CENI office by office.
The enthusiasm shown by our people to go see for themselves the same results on election day was also shared with political parties. They know that the results released by CENI are consistent with the records in their possession but they dare not show for fear that the people do not tell them: "You liars and not CENI." Thus the only candidate who has made an application for annulment of the elections did not even dare to join not even one file on record contradicting the results of Pastor Ngoy Mulunda.
What happened to the reports collected by the witnesses of the candidates in the polls on election day? On behalf of peace, the opposition has an obligation to also display the records in its possession to the attention of their supporters so that everyone can compare them to results published on the internet by CENI (the memos should be authentic and void of erasures or alterations). Being transparent is the obligation of all parties. What happened to the records of 30 000 observers (on 69 000 polling stations!) made by the Catholic Church?
The Carter mission accepts the ranking of candidates as published by the CENI without explaining the reasons in its statement that is a statement of exceptions! What are the reasons for this imbalance in the perfect presentation of the facts when it carries the risk of persuading some of our people it has let fly off his victory? This attitude may be due to chance. The message is clear: the Congo must choose to submit and be a permanent source of tension.
In other places the Carter Mission’s statement would be called otherwise than a rag (except of course if the authors were careful to specify that this is a report of observation of elections in a country of Negroes). The Carter Center experts who wrote the Declaration of the people are highly educated and experienced, they know by heart all the professional standards set out above. We may be talking about a language of the deaf in the beginning; this is not the same mission.
Is there really complementarity between our interests and theirs? Read that the Carter mission statement and compare it to that of the European Union's: this is surely the white cap and cap White! Same fight? The Declaration of the European mission is even funnier: it suggests to the CENI, with no cold feet, to display the memos of the more than 63,000 polling stations on the internet to close the debate. This is the reversal of the burden of proof: the accused CENI is enjoined to prove his innocence!
The paradigm of the colonized intellectual prevent many compatriots always looking for the security of the West to be convinced they are on track to admit that their support to a valid point of view opposed to the Western position even when the incompetence, lack of professionalism or bad faith seem as glaring as earlier.
Yesterday, no one believed us being capable of living together in a government of 4+1. Do not underestimate our ability to solve our problems alone regardless of the apparent complexity, but only if the starting point is not a rag like the one we just discussed. Let’s replace that stuff through dialogue. The underlying reason for all our behavior is unlikely scarcity.
We share the love of our country and sharing almost daily humiliation, taunting the world and above all the condition endured by our people because they have a political class able to go in the direction of the national interest when necessary. We can draw on the strength of these disadvantages and unite to find solutions. The primary mission of the Mediation Committee is in our view the initiation of dialogue between the main protagonists. These elections tell us that in Congolese politics the more one weighs the less they speak: that can now be limited to the essential scope of negotiations.
If the truth is not restored, true reconciliation cannot be considered. We cannot require from the one with that feeling of being victim of an injustice to simply forget in the name of love of the country. The same one who won should not be misled by the proponents of the speech "The dogs bark, the caravan moves on!"
The precondition for lasting reconciliation necessarily requires the establishment of a public commission with a mandate regarding the elections, soothing to respond to questions above and draw the consequences for not to jeopardize our fragile democracy. This is to ensure that 2016 resembles neither 2006 nor 2011 which have been a nightmare for some of our compatriots.
In our opinion the limited framework of this approach may be limited to five parts: the Electoral Commission, civil society, the international community and the delegates of Tshisekedi and Kabila as candidates only (must absolutely be excluded some opposition hypocrites who, against all good sense, are responsible for the dispersion of the opposition and have stripped Tshisekedi of more 3000 000 votes and today when there is nothing left to save they show "their solidarity".
The election issue in the DRC raises doubts about the relevance of the observations of each other. Indeed at first it was the official website of the electoral commission (CENI) that was hijacked by an unknown hand in order to show false results of the presidential election of November 28, 2011. Then fell a statement called "Post - Election Statement of the compilation and announcement of provisional results of the presidential election" published on the Carter Center website, which is of a so doubtful professionalism that one would think if it actually comes from a prestigious center named after the former U.S. President.
Is it this statement that is not credible, or rather the Congolese election the center says not to be? If, against common sense, it would enjoy, however, the moral authority which it is named after, we will then conclude that, when it comes to the DRC, the Carter Mission is not required to meet international standards with regard to the restitution of the findings of an election observation.
The analysis of this statement attributed to the Carter Center raises legitimate suspicions naturally credibility, given the fact that it does not meet either on the form or in substance with international standards in this area. The following is an independent assessment of the Declaration by reference to the standards set by three authoritative international institutions:
1.The Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation (DPO), subscribed to by, on October 24, 2005, 37 observer groups including: The Carter Center itself, the European Commission, the Organization of the United Nations, Organization of American States ...
2.The election observation guidelines (DOE) of the European Union (EU), second edition 2008;
3.The Practical guide for monitoring groups of national elections in the Southern African Development Community, SADC (SADC-ESN).
The reports of election observation in accordance with the above references are:
1. Interim reports: issued throughout the observation process, these reports are used for internal communication within the group of observation;
2. The opening statement: According to EU Directives, this statement is "the first post-election evaluation performed, released at a press conference 48 hours after the polls close. It is intended for the public and should be designed to be read by election stakeholders in the host country (candidates, political parties, domestic observers, journalists, voters, etc.). It presents the findings and preliminary conclusions of the observation mission on the steps of the electoral process which has just taken place and shall specify how the mission considers that the elections were conducted, until the declaration in accordance with international electoral standards. As such, the opening statement is an important indicator of the credibility of the electoral process for election stakeholders "(emphasis added)
3. A second opening statement: it is optional and can be made out if the mission considers that it must continue to observe the end of the counting process, the tabulation and the publication of results.
4. The final report: it contains the overall assessment of the election by the mission. It is released within two months after the end of the electoral process.
Examination of the facts as to the form of findings of the Carter Mission
As of November 30, 2011, two days after the election, the Carter Center publishes on its website the first draft of its mission statement on the elections of 28 November 2011 under the title "Democratic Republic of Congo, Presidential and Legislative Elections, Nov. 28, 2011 Post Election Preliminary Statement." This statement is published in English and we are not aware of any publication in French.
In this regard, the required international standard is: "The declaration must be evenly distributed ... for information in appropriate languages, to representatives of their areas of responsibility." The main recipient of the statement in question is none other than the Congolese people who speak French and not English. Who then is it for?
In a press briefing the same day, November 30, 2011, at the Grand Hotel Kinshasa, the mission makes public the Declaration. On this occasion, it keeps the rule of delivering their opinion on the overall credibility of the electoral process and the voting process itself. This statement only highlights the enthusiasm of the Congolese people on election day and the organizational shortcomings.
The prudence observed by the Carter Mission at that time was already in fact a departure from international standards which require the observer to make public his views on the proper conduct of elections immediately after the election regardless of the publication of the results thereof. This is to ensure that the observer does not change its preliminary findings on the electoral process accordingly after the results are published.
A careful reading of the declaration of November 30 shows that at this stage already all acts of violence that characterized the pre-election period and election day are placed on the back of the Government of the DRC. This is reminiscent of the attitude of a report by Human Rights Watch published a few days ago and spoke of 18 cases of murder by the presidential guard without providing evidence to date despite the insistent demands of prosecutors. The latest news is Human Rights Watch would have said to have drawn information from a website!
Another important fact to note is that on the same day of 30 November 2011, the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS ), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) have issued a joint preliminary statement commending the efforts made by CENI for the satisfactory conduct of these elections while deploring the violence that marred the election.
The African missions conformed well to point 8 of OPD which requirement can be read as follows: "The organizations that endorse this Declaration and the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers attached to the Declaration commit to cooperate with each other in part of the international election observation missions. Observation can be performed, for example, individual missions, for observation missions or joint ad hoc collaborative missions. In all cases, organizations that adopt the Declaration agree to cooperate to get the most out of the action of their observer missions." This obligation is supported by the DOE of the EU state: "A common practice groups of observers who are signatories to the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation is to share their findings prior to the publication of their preliminary statements."
Neither the mission of the Carter Center nor the EU has followed this standard by joining the African delegations that day. Already at this stage, it is questionable whether this similarity in behavior of the Western delegations who gave the impression to obey a single watchword!
In addition, international standards require observation missions to respect the authority of the host country and the authority organizing the elections in these terms: "The international election observation missions should be conducted in accordance with the sovereignty of the country holding the elections ... They must respect the laws and authorities, including electoral institutions of the country that hosts them.” This respect is expressed in particular by "notice of the preliminary statement to the local authority holding the elections at least one hour before the press conference ..." according to DOE. However, the Office of the CENI learned of the preliminary statements of Western observers at the same time as the public!
Apart from these acts of insubordination standards for communication of their findings and contempt against the Congolese authorities, the doubtful professionalism of the Declaration of the Carter Center can also be found in the fact that according to the DOE, the Chief Observer of the mission signs the observation report. In this case the statement is signed by the Carter Center person. The published statement merely indicates two names and two telephone numbers which are neither those of the former President of Zambia, Rupiah Banda Bwezani or those of vice-president of the Carter Center, Dr. John Stremlau who led the Mission in the DRC. We just learned also that Rupiah Banda has made a statement in which he said he did not recognize the statement attributed to the mission he led.
To close this chapter on considerations about the shape, it should be noted, too, the translation of the Declaration in the French language is often very rough, forcing the interested reader to refer to the English to understand what the mission means exactly. The reader can notice it from reading the quotes from the Declaration faithfully reproduced in the text. How can we relate the name of a respected president to a mission met with such shortcomings?
Review of developments in substance
Before discussing this, remember the object of an observation mission: “ international election observation means: the systematic, accurate and comprehensive information on legislation, institutions and mechanisms governing the conduct of elections and other factors concerning the overall electoral environment; professional and impartial analysis of this information and drawing conclusions about the nature of electoral processes to the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of the analysis.” Cfr OPD.
It is therefore to rule on the legality and compliance of the electoral process standards in this area and electoral laws and regulations of the country concerned. The opinion of the observer of the process allows recipients of its conclusions to draw their own conclusions on the results announced. Not known to parallel the work of the election organizing authority and lacking the material means and human resources is not expected of the observer or the proclamation of the winner or the loser.
To return to the statement before us, the Code of Conduct attached to the DPO signed by the Carter Center stated that the content of monitoring reports must:
"Ensure the accuracy of the observations and show professionalism in the preparation of conclusions; Observers must ensure that all their observations are accurate and complete attention to the points both positive and negative, distinguishing between factors important and those who are not and calling attention to the patterns that may have important implications for the integrity of the electoral process.”
Observers' judgments must meet the highest standards of accuracy of the information and impartiality of analysis, a distinction must be made between subjective and objective evidence. Observers must base all conclusions on factual and verifiable evidence and not draw premature conclusions. They must consistently and accurately note the places where they made their comments, observations and other information useful to the observer mission, which they must give that statement."
The EU Directives complement this: "All reports of the mission must clearly indicate what has been directly observed by EU observers and what they were reported by their partners ... information without proof to support, or from a single source and partisan, must be clearly identified as such" (emphasis added).
In addition to the inaccuracies, curious omissions, the wrong figures and recklessness as to whether isolated or widespread anomalies, the main feature of the Declaration under analysis is an evocation of a list of facts or malfunction of the process identified by the Mission but the impact on the election result declared is never rated! And from these questionable premises, the authors of the declaration still draw conclusions for the least, ambiguous.
Before discussing this, remember the object of an observation mission: “ international election observation means: the systematic, accurate and comprehensive information on legislation, institutions and mechanisms governing the conduct of elections and other factors concerning the overall electoral environment; professional and impartial analysis of this information and drawing conclusions about the nature of electoral processes to the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of the analysis.” Cfr OPD.
It is therefore to rule on the legality and compliance of the electoral process standards in this area and electoral laws and regulations of the country concerned. The opinion of the observer of the process allows recipients of its conclusions to draw their own conclusions on the results announced. Not known to parallel the work of the election organizing authority and lacking the material means and human resources is not expected of the observer or the proclamation of the winner or the loser.
To return to the statement before us, the Code of Conduct attached to the DPO signed by the Carter Center stated that the content of monitoring reports must:
"Ensure the accuracy of the observations and show professionalism in the preparation of conclusions; Observers must ensure that all their observations are accurate and complete attention to the points both positive and negative, distinguishing between factors important and those who are not and calling attention to the patterns that may have important implications for the integrity of the electoral process.”
Observers' judgments must meet the highest standards of accuracy of the information and impartiality of analysis, a distinction must be made between subjective and objective evidence. Observers must base all conclusions on factual and verifiable evidence and not draw premature conclusions. They must consistently and accurately note the places where they made their comments, observations and other information useful to the observer mission, which they must give that statement."
The EU Directives complement this: "All reports of the mission must clearly indicate what has been directly observed by EU observers and what they were reported by their partners ... information without proof to support, or from a single source and partisan, must be clearly identified as such" (emphasis added).
In addition to the inaccuracies, curious omissions, the wrong figures and recklessness as to whether isolated or widespread anomalies, the main feature of the Declaration under analysis is an evocation of a list of facts or malfunction of the process identified by the Mission but the impact on the election result declared is never rated! And from these questionable premises, the authors of the declaration still draw conclusions for the least, ambiguous.
1 ° Glaring contradictions do not seem to interfere with the Mission
a) First, "for the Carter Center the provisional results of the presidential elections announced by the Independent National Electoral Commission on December 9 in the Democratic Republic of Congo lack credibility." And also: "This statement does not question the order of the results of candidates such that` announced by the CENI but specifies that the compilation process is not credible .... "
As the reader can see, the Mission concludes that only one of five stages of the electoral process is not credible and fails to rule on the conduct of other crucial steps including the recruitment, voting and counting, it is quite at ease in extrapolating its findings to the entire compilation of the electoral process without challenging the victory of one candidate! This attitude is anything but professional.
And still about the same process found not credible, the Declaration says further:
"In many CLCR observed (including Boma, Matadi, Bandundu, Mweka) Carter Center observers found a process that they deemed acceptable or satisfactory in 60% of cases. The evaluation of other sites varies, with 40% considered poor, based on an overall assessment of the procedures. (Emphasis added) "
To what principle an acceptable process, applied correctly in 60% of cases can be both globally not credible? If these inconsistencies were scarcely credible in the report of a group of African observation in a European country, it will be mocked at will for months. It's quite the opposite with us and thereby to dare address a report by the prestigious Carter Center is already a sacrilege to some, an expression of the paradigm of the colonized intellectual, always in need of help.
b) "The problems observed during the compilation phase and the reported numbers are compounded by poor access of observers to the compilation centers across the country and the lack of official access to the national results center in Kinshasa. The Carter Center is unable to provide independent verification of the accuracy of all results or the degree to which they reflect the will of the Congolese people."
In other professions such as financial audit, for example, when the auditor concludes that significant limitations were imposed on the discharge of his mandate, he refrains from expressing an opinion that he cannot substantiate. So if anyone has been able to prevent the Carter's mission to fulfill its mandate, something not reported in its opening statement first, should we conclude that the results published by the CENI are not credible intrinsically or for the simple reason that the mission could not verify its accuracy as a whole?
Under which text the Carter's mission received mandate to remake the work of the CENI by checking the accuracy of all results published by the latter? How can we have observed the elections in 25 CLCR (whose mapping and electoral weight are not shown) of 169 nationally and claim to verify the operation of the sites we could not observe?
a) First, "for the Carter Center the provisional results of the presidential elections announced by the Independent National Electoral Commission on December 9 in the Democratic Republic of Congo lack credibility." And also: "This statement does not question the order of the results of candidates such that` announced by the CENI but specifies that the compilation process is not credible .... "
As the reader can see, the Mission concludes that only one of five stages of the electoral process is not credible and fails to rule on the conduct of other crucial steps including the recruitment, voting and counting, it is quite at ease in extrapolating its findings to the entire compilation of the electoral process without challenging the victory of one candidate! This attitude is anything but professional.
And still about the same process found not credible, the Declaration says further:
"In many CLCR observed (including Boma, Matadi, Bandundu, Mweka) Carter Center observers found a process that they deemed acceptable or satisfactory in 60% of cases. The evaluation of other sites varies, with 40% considered poor, based on an overall assessment of the procedures. (Emphasis added) "
To what principle an acceptable process, applied correctly in 60% of cases can be both globally not credible? If these inconsistencies were scarcely credible in the report of a group of African observation in a European country, it will be mocked at will for months. It's quite the opposite with us and thereby to dare address a report by the prestigious Carter Center is already a sacrilege to some, an expression of the paradigm of the colonized intellectual, always in need of help.
b) "The problems observed during the compilation phase and the reported numbers are compounded by poor access of observers to the compilation centers across the country and the lack of official access to the national results center in Kinshasa. The Carter Center is unable to provide independent verification of the accuracy of all results or the degree to which they reflect the will of the Congolese people."
In other professions such as financial audit, for example, when the auditor concludes that significant limitations were imposed on the discharge of his mandate, he refrains from expressing an opinion that he cannot substantiate. So if anyone has been able to prevent the Carter's mission to fulfill its mandate, something not reported in its opening statement first, should we conclude that the results published by the CENI are not credible intrinsically or for the simple reason that the mission could not verify its accuracy as a whole?
Under which text the Carter's mission received mandate to remake the work of the CENI by checking the accuracy of all results published by the latter? How can we have observed the elections in 25 CLCR (whose mapping and electoral weight are not shown) of 169 nationally and claim to verify the operation of the sites we could not observe?
2 ° A dramatization of "anomalies" not quantified, however, suggesting a cheating not established
a) "In Kinshasa, nearly 2,000 folds of the results of the polling stations were lost (representing about 350.000 voters) and will not be counted ... To this are added other 1.000 folds that have been lost in the rest of countries (representing 500.000 voters)."
b) "Based on the detailed results published by the CENI, it is also observed in various places, including several districts of the province of Katanga, where were found the very high participation rate of 99% or even 100%, the results were favorable to the outgoing President Joseph Kabila of ... The CLCR Malemba Nkulu reported a stake of 99.46% with 100% of the vote. The territory of Kabongo is similar with a high turnout and almost 100% ... A review of where Etienne Tshisekedi, presidential candidate, has won a high number of votes does not show the same coincidence of perfect recovery of data from polling stations, or the extremely high participation (emphasis added). "
The loss of nearly 3,000 electoral packages was also deplored by the CENI. The Mission, however, fails to specify that it does not affect the published results from the fact that these folds could not be compiled. Because the losses in question were found for all the provinces, no one can say which candidate has therefore been prejudiced. This is yet submitted by the Mission to support the theory of chaos and yet leave some compatriots think that these losses result from a deliberate intention to harm their candidate. This is a curious way to present its findings when it comes to a country where peace is still fragile; this is attested by the very presence of blue helmets of the UN in the DRC and care should be well taken into account in any pronouncements.
The report fails to note that of the 25 local centers of compilation of Katanga, the participation rate of 100% is reported only to Manono and the rate close to 100% was noted in two centers: at Bukama and Malemba Nkulu. Of a total of 25 centers, three centers! The average attendance rate in the province of Katanga, the report is silent, which is 69.68% higher than the national average (58%), a 10% difference!
Sociological reading of this participation in the respective provinces of these two heavyweights, however, can clearly explain the anomalies that are apparent. In a province where the political class has consistently pulled the ethnic rope, mass participation in Katanga is a matter of life and death when it comes to stop the rise of a native of Kasai as it is essential to avert the colonization by Kasai.
Conversely in the fiefs of Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, it is not surprising that ethnic minorities who have allegiance to the powers that be do not vote primarily for the latter (shown through the results of CLCR Katakokombe 9.08%, 6.58% Lodja, Kole 32.87%, 49.26% and Mweka Dekese 42.32%). But one must also consider the psychological factors: the suspicion of a planned cheat whose fiery speeches watered populations throughout the campaign eventually persuaded some voters to the futility of believing that the vote dice were loaded in advance. In addition, widespread violence and blood that flowed abundantly in the two Kasai against supporters of the outgoing President was not likely to encourage them a strong turnout.
About the “Soviet scores” assigned to the outgoing President in parts of his home province, the report fails to note that Kabila has certainly achieved scores over 90% in 16 centers in Katanga compilation of 25 centers. But he too, in the two Kasai, Etienne Tshisekedi has made this same type of scores - he does not come to the spirit of the Mission to imagine that this would be provided as a result ballot stuffing .
In 14 of 30 centers in fact, Wa Mulumba achieved scores above 90%. This is the case of Kabeya Kamuanga 98.14%, 94.39 Kamiji, Katanda 95.66%, 96.68% Lupatapata, Mbuji-Mayi 97.29%, 97.45% Miabi, Muene-Ditu 94.17 %, 95.22% Ngandaika, Demba 93.21% Dibaya 95.32%, 94.08% Dimbelenge, Kananga 95.68%, 95.30% and Luiza Kazumba 96%! Under what purpose does the Carter Center seek to attract the attention of the world about scores of 100% made by Kabila but does not indicate that this relates only to scores of two compilation centers of the 169?
Why not also say to the world that the birthplace of President Kabila is in one of these two centers that are also very close? Why not remind the opinion that in 2006 already, while the presidential election was organized by the UN Mission in the DRC, the two centers gave the most of their votes to the same candidate who is their son? In Africa, where do we vote for the opposition in the village of Head of State in office?
By concealing the information which would push the reader to relativize the "cheating", the Mission sins against the standard set by the Guide, which says in these mandatory terms: "Quantify your conclusions. Be specific about the number of cases or the number of districts in which a violation was observed. Was it an anomaly or a trend? This violation was it specific to a specific region or has it been observed throughout the country? ... Avoid using language that ignites - this could harm your credibility and create tension ... Do not distort the statistics. When you use statistics in reports make sure to present the most direct way possible in order not to mislead your readers into error (emphasis added. "Cfr The Guide
Why the report of the Mission does it highlight the elements of nature to inflame passions, while the purpose of any observation mission is to help ensure peace and stability in the country? Or did the mission have another mandate to achieve in the Congo?
Impartiality is the golden rule for any election observation for one simple reason: In order to guarantee the rights of all citizens, whenever the viewer chooses his side, he runs the risk of defeating the rights if his opponent's choice is not motivated by evidence which may assist the losers to accept defeat.
This is the standard that says so and not us, "the observers shall perform their duties impartially and shall at no time express any bias or preference in relation to the authorities, parties and the candidates, or with respect to the issues of the electoral process."
Moreover, ultimately it is the people involved that determine the credibility and legitimacy of the electoral process.
3 Information from non-credible sources
The Declaration cites numerous facts that look like "they say," to rumors and gossip that do not honor the Mission. For example it can be noted:
a) "The heads of polling stations and counting were seen opening sealed envelopes containing scorecards and supplementing or altering documents in violation of electoral procedures."
What could be the impact on the result announced? Did you witness this in person?
b) "In some cases, the documents alleged to have been transferred to the Supreme Court, which remains at this stage impossible to confirm."
So why report it?
c) "CLCR staff sometimes seemed to be poorly trained and in some cases not trained at all in the words of their colleagues”
No comment!
d) "In Lubumbashi, the Carter Center observers have heard the President of CLCR instruct its staff during their training not to give any information to observers."
What can we still then hide from an observer who is welcome at training sessions of cheats?
The standard says: "Do not import" hearsay "- all findings must be studied and verified by the observer group." The Guide
4 ° Legitimate concerns into perspective, however, not
"The transmission and data management was conducted in a non-transparent manner, eliminating an important opportunity to strengthen confidence in the final results from the ability to check performance management compiled by observers and witnesses of political parties ... The process compilation in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi was particularly problematic."
The failures of the compilation process are regrettable and certainly the Mission is due to address them. However, the mission does not moderate their comments and criticisms by taking into account the existence in the Congolese electoral procedures for compensatory means precisely aimed to remedy for possible malfunctions of the compilation. This is upstream of the principle of transformation of the polling station into the office for counting followed by the display of memorandum of results (signed by the members of CENI, observers, witnesses, candidates and representatives of voters) and after the publication of details of the results compiled polling station by polling station.
On election day, there has been a craze on the part of voters to inquire about the verdict in their respective offices. Thus, each party could make its own compilation. With a minimum of cooperation and organization, political parties of the opposition could gather PV (memoranda) covering all polling stations. It was enough then to compare the results with those detailed office by office as published online by the electoral Commission (CENI).
And this is precisely the problem with this observation: the Mission did not deliver, at least at this stage an opinion on this crucial stage of the count. In the aftermath of the vote at its first opening statement, the Carter Mission had an obligation to set the view on the following questions: Were the elections devoid of any intimidation, violence and fraud or not? The elections were they "truly democratic" or "undemocratic"? Was there transparency and compliance procedures during the counting, development, distribution and display of PV (memoranda) or not?
5 ° Inaccuracies
"When a recount of ballots was necessary, witnesses were present in only a small majority of cases observed."
A slim majority is not a majority. At what percentage the majority becomes low?
6. Minutes of Intent
"In most cases observed, CLCR were properly secured by the police, however in 15% of cases, their behavior may have intimidated CLCR staff."
7. Inaccurate figures
"Joseph Kabila with 49 percent of the votes followed by Etienne Tshisekedi with 32 percent and 7.7 percent for Vital Kamerhe. The national participation rate is 58 percent."
The provisional results of votes issued by the Electoral Commission (CENI) on its official website provide information disparities with the figures that have just been submitted by the Carter mission: Joseph Kabila 48.95%, 32.33% and Etienne Tshisekedi Vital Kamerhe 7.74.
The mission rounded each result to the nearest unit. Is this conventional behavior? Even in this case, we see that the rule is not applied consistently to all candidates listed!
8. Severe facts deliberately omitted
a) Acts of unprecedented violence
The starting point of an election observation is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which recognizes that it is the expressed will of the people through regular elections and general universal suffrage that determines who should govern them. Therefore, it is imperative for the observer to report any serious incident that occurs before or on election day and having it prevented to some of the people to elect or be elected. There was in this country, as of November 28, 2011, at the opening of polling stations critical events that the mission did not publish: an armed commando attacked and destroyed two vehicles driven and deployed by the Electoral Commission (CENI) to deploy voting equipment in the city of Lubumbashi. Ballots for nearly 300 polling stations were so charred. Such incidents have been deplored in Kinshasa while in other areas, and more specifically in the two Kasai, activists overexcited by the speech of alleged bias attributed to the CENI vandalized nearly half of polling stations in the city of Kananga and many other surrounding communities.
Personalities from two Kasai could not vote. Some were beaten when their homes were not looted. Still others were forced to seek refuge in the forest. This is especially true of the President of the National Assembly, Evariste Boshab, the national MP Kazadi Nyembwe, the Minister of Energy Tshiongo Tshibi Nkubula, artist Tshiala Muana, Francois Muamba, Crispin Kankonde and nuns molested and stripped naked in public ... all suspected to have ballot papers already ticked to the benefit of the candidate Kabila. In Kananga and Mbuji-Mayi real manhunt did not allow witnesses of Kabila access to polling stations without risking their lives: this is common knowledge.
In Congo, it is the supporters of the ruling party that are living with the scared face of opposition fighters: despite having received 30.30% of votes in Kinshasa, the capital, Kabila supporters have not dared to put their nose out to celebrate the victory of their candidate! Elsewhere in Africa, it is rather the opposite. Two days before the election, activists of a political party have trashed the permanence of another political party allied to the ruling party, causing 5 dead and over 50 injured. These acts of violence that were not isolated incidents but widespread throughout the country do not they deserve to be mentioned in the Declaration?
This omission is particularly serious that it does not help the reader understand in part why the vote of nearly 3,000 offices cannot be taken into account, however, is raised by the Mission to establish reserves. We saw the CENI forced to deploy election materials in unmarked cars; the heads of the centers had to do the same to unload packages they were responsible for for compilation centers at the risk of their lives since that day it was cried death on all that was called CENI. Had not been the National Police, which is being vilified by the Mission no compilation would have taken place. The Mission reported in great detail the chaos that has resulted and never causes!
Reporting of such serious facts is not optional; standards in the field direct the mission to report them. The Practical Guide to SADC writes: "In case of serious or violent incident, either during the election campaign or the election day, you should prepare a report on the event to provide impartial information on what has occurred. Your group may also request that measures be taken then, as an investigation by the authorities or to mediate between the political parties."
b) The new challenges of organization
The electoral commission (CENI) has had seven months to make these elections in a post-conflict country and five times as large as France. More than 18 000 national candidates for Members of Parliament is not a regular occurrence in the electoral history of the planet. The ballots of more than 56 pages! The international community did not respect the commitment to contribute to 40%. The electoral costs were nearly fully incurred by the Government.
Nature also got involved by depriving the CENI benefits of international experts who all died in the crash of Kisangani in the wake of its creation. A week from voting, MONUSCO (UN Mission in DRC) who had originally committed to service 213 territories with its aircrafts informs the CENI of its withdrawal one week before deployment. Finally MONUSCO will cover barely 83 territories of 213! It is not easy to be the Congo.
The poll ended on 30 November and the results should be published by CENI on December 6 for reasons of constitutional constraints, this date corresponds to the expiration of the five-year term of the outgoing President. The publication will only happen two days later. For those who do not know this: the CENI is governed by a board composed of seven members, three from the opposition. The Vice President's office is assumed by the former campaign manager for Jean Pierre Bemba, Professor Jacques Ndjoli.
How many countries on the planet an electoral commission has published the results of an election and immediately put them on CD ROM and Internet for the entire world attention? The manual was compiled. Within six days, how was it possible to combine seamlessly to the operations of compilation: 1,777,130 witnesses of political parties and independent candidates certified by the CENI, 108,238 domestic observers, 785 international observers, national journalists 1747 and 62 foreign journalists, or 1,887,962 people?
It seems that the world had made an appointment to the Congo to prevent cheating and ensure the alternation (This does not fail to recall a pattern revealed some time ago by the former adviser to Mobutu, H. Ngbanda). When one divides this beautiful world into 169 centers each compilation was to host 11 171 "witnesses"!
How can one describe the operations of compilation as chaotic, label the CENI as incompetent and disorganized and even claim that within six days of compiling the results as poor, an institution could roll in flour 1,881,962 people in 169 centers (the report says that 90% of controls were admitted) without that, to date no one yet dares say how it actually operated?
9 ° The value judgments made about the decisions and actions of local authorities
a) "On December 3, the interior minister ordered the suspension of the transmission and reception of SMS justified by the mass distribution of death threats and calls to violence. This measure is an undue restriction on freedom of expression while the authors of these messages could be identified and prosecuted through the normal judicial proceedings."
a) "In Kinshasa, nearly 2,000 folds of the results of the polling stations were lost (representing about 350.000 voters) and will not be counted ... To this are added other 1.000 folds that have been lost in the rest of countries (representing 500.000 voters)."
b) "Based on the detailed results published by the CENI, it is also observed in various places, including several districts of the province of Katanga, where were found the very high participation rate of 99% or even 100%, the results were favorable to the outgoing President Joseph Kabila of ... The CLCR Malemba Nkulu reported a stake of 99.46% with 100% of the vote. The territory of Kabongo is similar with a high turnout and almost 100% ... A review of where Etienne Tshisekedi, presidential candidate, has won a high number of votes does not show the same coincidence of perfect recovery of data from polling stations, or the extremely high participation (emphasis added). "
The loss of nearly 3,000 electoral packages was also deplored by the CENI. The Mission, however, fails to specify that it does not affect the published results from the fact that these folds could not be compiled. Because the losses in question were found for all the provinces, no one can say which candidate has therefore been prejudiced. This is yet submitted by the Mission to support the theory of chaos and yet leave some compatriots think that these losses result from a deliberate intention to harm their candidate. This is a curious way to present its findings when it comes to a country where peace is still fragile; this is attested by the very presence of blue helmets of the UN in the DRC and care should be well taken into account in any pronouncements.
The report fails to note that of the 25 local centers of compilation of Katanga, the participation rate of 100% is reported only to Manono and the rate close to 100% was noted in two centers: at Bukama and Malemba Nkulu. Of a total of 25 centers, three centers! The average attendance rate in the province of Katanga, the report is silent, which is 69.68% higher than the national average (58%), a 10% difference!
Sociological reading of this participation in the respective provinces of these two heavyweights, however, can clearly explain the anomalies that are apparent. In a province where the political class has consistently pulled the ethnic rope, mass participation in Katanga is a matter of life and death when it comes to stop the rise of a native of Kasai as it is essential to avert the colonization by Kasai.
Conversely in the fiefs of Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, it is not surprising that ethnic minorities who have allegiance to the powers that be do not vote primarily for the latter (shown through the results of CLCR Katakokombe 9.08%, 6.58% Lodja, Kole 32.87%, 49.26% and Mweka Dekese 42.32%). But one must also consider the psychological factors: the suspicion of a planned cheat whose fiery speeches watered populations throughout the campaign eventually persuaded some voters to the futility of believing that the vote dice were loaded in advance. In addition, widespread violence and blood that flowed abundantly in the two Kasai against supporters of the outgoing President was not likely to encourage them a strong turnout.
About the “Soviet scores” assigned to the outgoing President in parts of his home province, the report fails to note that Kabila has certainly achieved scores over 90% in 16 centers in Katanga compilation of 25 centers. But he too, in the two Kasai, Etienne Tshisekedi has made this same type of scores - he does not come to the spirit of the Mission to imagine that this would be provided as a result ballot stuffing .
In 14 of 30 centers in fact, Wa Mulumba achieved scores above 90%. This is the case of Kabeya Kamuanga 98.14%, 94.39 Kamiji, Katanda 95.66%, 96.68% Lupatapata, Mbuji-Mayi 97.29%, 97.45% Miabi, Muene-Ditu 94.17 %, 95.22% Ngandaika, Demba 93.21% Dibaya 95.32%, 94.08% Dimbelenge, Kananga 95.68%, 95.30% and Luiza Kazumba 96%! Under what purpose does the Carter Center seek to attract the attention of the world about scores of 100% made by Kabila but does not indicate that this relates only to scores of two compilation centers of the 169?
Why not also say to the world that the birthplace of President Kabila is in one of these two centers that are also very close? Why not remind the opinion that in 2006 already, while the presidential election was organized by the UN Mission in the DRC, the two centers gave the most of their votes to the same candidate who is their son? In Africa, where do we vote for the opposition in the village of Head of State in office?
By concealing the information which would push the reader to relativize the "cheating", the Mission sins against the standard set by the Guide, which says in these mandatory terms: "Quantify your conclusions. Be specific about the number of cases or the number of districts in which a violation was observed. Was it an anomaly or a trend? This violation was it specific to a specific region or has it been observed throughout the country? ... Avoid using language that ignites - this could harm your credibility and create tension ... Do not distort the statistics. When you use statistics in reports make sure to present the most direct way possible in order not to mislead your readers into error (emphasis added. "Cfr The Guide
Why the report of the Mission does it highlight the elements of nature to inflame passions, while the purpose of any observation mission is to help ensure peace and stability in the country? Or did the mission have another mandate to achieve in the Congo?
Impartiality is the golden rule for any election observation for one simple reason: In order to guarantee the rights of all citizens, whenever the viewer chooses his side, he runs the risk of defeating the rights if his opponent's choice is not motivated by evidence which may assist the losers to accept defeat.
This is the standard that says so and not us, "the observers shall perform their duties impartially and shall at no time express any bias or preference in relation to the authorities, parties and the candidates, or with respect to the issues of the electoral process."
Moreover, ultimately it is the people involved that determine the credibility and legitimacy of the electoral process.
3 Information from non-credible sources
The Declaration cites numerous facts that look like "they say," to rumors and gossip that do not honor the Mission. For example it can be noted:
a) "The heads of polling stations and counting were seen opening sealed envelopes containing scorecards and supplementing or altering documents in violation of electoral procedures."
What could be the impact on the result announced? Did you witness this in person?
b) "In some cases, the documents alleged to have been transferred to the Supreme Court, which remains at this stage impossible to confirm."
So why report it?
c) "CLCR staff sometimes seemed to be poorly trained and in some cases not trained at all in the words of their colleagues”
No comment!
d) "In Lubumbashi, the Carter Center observers have heard the President of CLCR instruct its staff during their training not to give any information to observers."
What can we still then hide from an observer who is welcome at training sessions of cheats?
The standard says: "Do not import" hearsay "- all findings must be studied and verified by the observer group." The Guide
4 ° Legitimate concerns into perspective, however, not
"The transmission and data management was conducted in a non-transparent manner, eliminating an important opportunity to strengthen confidence in the final results from the ability to check performance management compiled by observers and witnesses of political parties ... The process compilation in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi was particularly problematic."
The failures of the compilation process are regrettable and certainly the Mission is due to address them. However, the mission does not moderate their comments and criticisms by taking into account the existence in the Congolese electoral procedures for compensatory means precisely aimed to remedy for possible malfunctions of the compilation. This is upstream of the principle of transformation of the polling station into the office for counting followed by the display of memorandum of results (signed by the members of CENI, observers, witnesses, candidates and representatives of voters) and after the publication of details of the results compiled polling station by polling station.
On election day, there has been a craze on the part of voters to inquire about the verdict in their respective offices. Thus, each party could make its own compilation. With a minimum of cooperation and organization, political parties of the opposition could gather PV (memoranda) covering all polling stations. It was enough then to compare the results with those detailed office by office as published online by the electoral Commission (CENI).
And this is precisely the problem with this observation: the Mission did not deliver, at least at this stage an opinion on this crucial stage of the count. In the aftermath of the vote at its first opening statement, the Carter Mission had an obligation to set the view on the following questions: Were the elections devoid of any intimidation, violence and fraud or not? The elections were they "truly democratic" or "undemocratic"? Was there transparency and compliance procedures during the counting, development, distribution and display of PV (memoranda) or not?
5 ° Inaccuracies
"When a recount of ballots was necessary, witnesses were present in only a small majority of cases observed."
A slim majority is not a majority. At what percentage the majority becomes low?
6. Minutes of Intent
"In most cases observed, CLCR were properly secured by the police, however in 15% of cases, their behavior may have intimidated CLCR staff."
7. Inaccurate figures
"Joseph Kabila with 49 percent of the votes followed by Etienne Tshisekedi with 32 percent and 7.7 percent for Vital Kamerhe. The national participation rate is 58 percent."
The provisional results of votes issued by the Electoral Commission (CENI) on its official website provide information disparities with the figures that have just been submitted by the Carter mission: Joseph Kabila 48.95%, 32.33% and Etienne Tshisekedi Vital Kamerhe 7.74.
The mission rounded each result to the nearest unit. Is this conventional behavior? Even in this case, we see that the rule is not applied consistently to all candidates listed!
8. Severe facts deliberately omitted
a) Acts of unprecedented violence
The starting point of an election observation is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which recognizes that it is the expressed will of the people through regular elections and general universal suffrage that determines who should govern them. Therefore, it is imperative for the observer to report any serious incident that occurs before or on election day and having it prevented to some of the people to elect or be elected. There was in this country, as of November 28, 2011, at the opening of polling stations critical events that the mission did not publish: an armed commando attacked and destroyed two vehicles driven and deployed by the Electoral Commission (CENI) to deploy voting equipment in the city of Lubumbashi. Ballots for nearly 300 polling stations were so charred. Such incidents have been deplored in Kinshasa while in other areas, and more specifically in the two Kasai, activists overexcited by the speech of alleged bias attributed to the CENI vandalized nearly half of polling stations in the city of Kananga and many other surrounding communities.
Personalities from two Kasai could not vote. Some were beaten when their homes were not looted. Still others were forced to seek refuge in the forest. This is especially true of the President of the National Assembly, Evariste Boshab, the national MP Kazadi Nyembwe, the Minister of Energy Tshiongo Tshibi Nkubula, artist Tshiala Muana, Francois Muamba, Crispin Kankonde and nuns molested and stripped naked in public ... all suspected to have ballot papers already ticked to the benefit of the candidate Kabila. In Kananga and Mbuji-Mayi real manhunt did not allow witnesses of Kabila access to polling stations without risking their lives: this is common knowledge.
In Congo, it is the supporters of the ruling party that are living with the scared face of opposition fighters: despite having received 30.30% of votes in Kinshasa, the capital, Kabila supporters have not dared to put their nose out to celebrate the victory of their candidate! Elsewhere in Africa, it is rather the opposite. Two days before the election, activists of a political party have trashed the permanence of another political party allied to the ruling party, causing 5 dead and over 50 injured. These acts of violence that were not isolated incidents but widespread throughout the country do not they deserve to be mentioned in the Declaration?
This omission is particularly serious that it does not help the reader understand in part why the vote of nearly 3,000 offices cannot be taken into account, however, is raised by the Mission to establish reserves. We saw the CENI forced to deploy election materials in unmarked cars; the heads of the centers had to do the same to unload packages they were responsible for for compilation centers at the risk of their lives since that day it was cried death on all that was called CENI. Had not been the National Police, which is being vilified by the Mission no compilation would have taken place. The Mission reported in great detail the chaos that has resulted and never causes!
Reporting of such serious facts is not optional; standards in the field direct the mission to report them. The Practical Guide to SADC writes: "In case of serious or violent incident, either during the election campaign or the election day, you should prepare a report on the event to provide impartial information on what has occurred. Your group may also request that measures be taken then, as an investigation by the authorities or to mediate between the political parties."
b) The new challenges of organization
The electoral commission (CENI) has had seven months to make these elections in a post-conflict country and five times as large as France. More than 18 000 national candidates for Members of Parliament is not a regular occurrence in the electoral history of the planet. The ballots of more than 56 pages! The international community did not respect the commitment to contribute to 40%. The electoral costs were nearly fully incurred by the Government.
Nature also got involved by depriving the CENI benefits of international experts who all died in the crash of Kisangani in the wake of its creation. A week from voting, MONUSCO (UN Mission in DRC) who had originally committed to service 213 territories with its aircrafts informs the CENI of its withdrawal one week before deployment. Finally MONUSCO will cover barely 83 territories of 213! It is not easy to be the Congo.
The poll ended on 30 November and the results should be published by CENI on December 6 for reasons of constitutional constraints, this date corresponds to the expiration of the five-year term of the outgoing President. The publication will only happen two days later. For those who do not know this: the CENI is governed by a board composed of seven members, three from the opposition. The Vice President's office is assumed by the former campaign manager for Jean Pierre Bemba, Professor Jacques Ndjoli.
How many countries on the planet an electoral commission has published the results of an election and immediately put them on CD ROM and Internet for the entire world attention? The manual was compiled. Within six days, how was it possible to combine seamlessly to the operations of compilation: 1,777,130 witnesses of political parties and independent candidates certified by the CENI, 108,238 domestic observers, 785 international observers, national journalists 1747 and 62 foreign journalists, or 1,887,962 people?
It seems that the world had made an appointment to the Congo to prevent cheating and ensure the alternation (This does not fail to recall a pattern revealed some time ago by the former adviser to Mobutu, H. Ngbanda). When one divides this beautiful world into 169 centers each compilation was to host 11 171 "witnesses"!
How can one describe the operations of compilation as chaotic, label the CENI as incompetent and disorganized and even claim that within six days of compiling the results as poor, an institution could roll in flour 1,881,962 people in 169 centers (the report says that 90% of controls were admitted) without that, to date no one yet dares say how it actually operated?
9 ° The value judgments made about the decisions and actions of local authorities
a) "On December 3, the interior minister ordered the suspension of the transmission and reception of SMS justified by the mass distribution of death threats and calls to violence. This measure is an undue restriction on freedom of expression while the authors of these messages could be identified and prosecuted through the normal judicial proceedings."
b) "Other exorbitant restrictions were applied to the media. The High Council for Audiovisual and Communication has suspended two broadcast networks without a formal decision and a newspaper close to the opposition. In Mbuji Mayi, police closed the RLTV for no reason. "
The international standard violated by these inappropriate positions has already been exposed in the first part of the article.
Conclusion
This election leads to many unanswered questions right now, including:
a) Is Congolese people entitled to a President of their choice or election of the latter should take place elsewhere?
b) Why did the international community recommend in word and deed the holding of the election when they knew fully well that the delay beyond the date of December 6 disqualified the current constitution and plunging the country's institutions in the crisis of illegitimacy that has lasted 46 years and from which the country was released in 2006 with the help of the same international community?
c) What is this invisible hand that wants to sabotage the election on November 28 and prevent the people from voting across the country?
d) Why one expatriate community (Chinese) had been particularly targeted by pre-and post-election violence?
e) Is the return of peace in this country really the central concern of the international community?
f) Is it true or not that before the election some Congolese had access to the ballot?
g) How many Congolese were unable to exercise their right to vote and why?
h) How the votes cast by the Congolese were not considered and why?
Whether the Carter Center says it or not, history will record that in this country, men and exceptional women have held truly democratic elections in a unique political context (characterized by a breed of politicians who lie to one religion), in particular binding deadlines for the sole purpose to save the Congo the risk of falling into the vagaries of the illegitimacy of its institutions to the fateful date of December 6, 2011.
It is for this reason that the Congolese opposition in its majority and its outside sponsors have desired that the elections be postponed (according to the Chairman of CENI, it was also the opinion of the Carter Mission). In this way, without consulting the decision maker (people), everyone could still take part in the division, it was enough to say loud and clear as in the heyday, "no one has been elected"! Today we know that between the walkabouts and polls there is a big difference.
It is careful to lay flowers to the men and women of the CENI, which some have demonstrated courage similar to that of the heroes of Chernobyl, for it is written that we must never give the Congolese a chance to be proud neither of their leaders nor their actions!
The conclusion of Carter's mission is: "This statement (read: any irregularities are found) does not affect the order of the results of candidates such that` announced by the CENI but specifies that the compilation process is not ... credible. " It comes to that because in all conscience they know that all the memoranda they filmed on the front of polling stations, those they have purchased or received from political parties and NGOs are in perfect harmony with the results posted on the Internet by CENI office by office.
The enthusiasm shown by our people to go see for themselves the same results on election day was also shared with political parties. They know that the results released by CENI are consistent with the records in their possession but they dare not show for fear that the people do not tell them: "You liars and not CENI." Thus the only candidate who has made an application for annulment of the elections did not even dare to join not even one file on record contradicting the results of Pastor Ngoy Mulunda.
What happened to the reports collected by the witnesses of the candidates in the polls on election day? On behalf of peace, the opposition has an obligation to also display the records in its possession to the attention of their supporters so that everyone can compare them to results published on the internet by CENI (the memos should be authentic and void of erasures or alterations). Being transparent is the obligation of all parties. What happened to the records of 30 000 observers (on 69 000 polling stations!) made by the Catholic Church?
The Carter mission accepts the ranking of candidates as published by the CENI without explaining the reasons in its statement that is a statement of exceptions! What are the reasons for this imbalance in the perfect presentation of the facts when it carries the risk of persuading some of our people it has let fly off his victory? This attitude may be due to chance. The message is clear: the Congo must choose to submit and be a permanent source of tension.
In other places the Carter Mission’s statement would be called otherwise than a rag (except of course if the authors were careful to specify that this is a report of observation of elections in a country of Negroes). The Carter Center experts who wrote the Declaration of the people are highly educated and experienced, they know by heart all the professional standards set out above. We may be talking about a language of the deaf in the beginning; this is not the same mission.
Is there really complementarity between our interests and theirs? Read that the Carter mission statement and compare it to that of the European Union's: this is surely the white cap and cap White! Same fight? The Declaration of the European mission is even funnier: it suggests to the CENI, with no cold feet, to display the memos of the more than 63,000 polling stations on the internet to close the debate. This is the reversal of the burden of proof: the accused CENI is enjoined to prove his innocence!
The paradigm of the colonized intellectual prevent many compatriots always looking for the security of the West to be convinced they are on track to admit that their support to a valid point of view opposed to the Western position even when the incompetence, lack of professionalism or bad faith seem as glaring as earlier.
Yesterday, no one believed us being capable of living together in a government of 4+1. Do not underestimate our ability to solve our problems alone regardless of the apparent complexity, but only if the starting point is not a rag like the one we just discussed. Let’s replace that stuff through dialogue. The underlying reason for all our behavior is unlikely scarcity.
We share the love of our country and sharing almost daily humiliation, taunting the world and above all the condition endured by our people because they have a political class able to go in the direction of the national interest when necessary. We can draw on the strength of these disadvantages and unite to find solutions. The primary mission of the Mediation Committee is in our view the initiation of dialogue between the main protagonists. These elections tell us that in Congolese politics the more one weighs the less they speak: that can now be limited to the essential scope of negotiations.
If the truth is not restored, true reconciliation cannot be considered. We cannot require from the one with that feeling of being victim of an injustice to simply forget in the name of love of the country. The same one who won should not be misled by the proponents of the speech "The dogs bark, the caravan moves on!"
The precondition for lasting reconciliation necessarily requires the establishment of a public commission with a mandate regarding the elections, soothing to respond to questions above and draw the consequences for not to jeopardize our fragile democracy. This is to ensure that 2016 resembles neither 2006 nor 2011 which have been a nightmare for some of our compatriots.
In our opinion the limited framework of this approach may be limited to five parts: the Electoral Commission, civil society, the international community and the delegates of Tshisekedi and Kabila as candidates only (must absolutely be excluded some opposition hypocrites who, against all good sense, are responsible for the dispersion of the opposition and have stripped Tshisekedi of more 3000 000 votes and today when there is nothing left to save they show "their solidarity".
